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SHIFTING RISK OF RUIN TO CONSUMERS: THE ROLE OF TAX 
LAW IN AMERICAN HEALTH POLICY 
TIMOTHY STOLTZFUS JOST* 
Of all developed countries, the United States is the one country where 
obtaining basic health care is most likely to result in financial ruin.1  In most 
developed countries, health care is paid for by government or social insurance 
programs.2  Many of these countries do impose cost-sharing obligations on 
patients, but those obligations are usually modest in size and capped at 
 
* Robert Willett Family Professor, Washington and Lee University School of Law.  The author 
also discusses consumer-driven health care in Our Broken Health Care System and How to Fix It: 
An Essay on Health Law and Policy, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 537 (2006).  These issues will be 
further considered in a book by Professor Jost, OUR BROKEN HEALTH CARE SYSTEM: CAN 
CONSUMERS FIX IT?, to be published by Duke University Press in 2007. 
 1. The Commonwealth Fund has for several years been tracking access to and quality of 
health care in six countries (Australia, Canada, Germany, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and 
the United States).  See KAREN DAVIS ET AL., THE COMMONWEALTH FUND, MIRROR, MIRROR 
ON THE WALL: AN UPDATE ON THE QUALITY OF AMERICAN HEALTH CARE THROUGH THE 
PATIENT’S LENS (Apr. 2006).  In 2005, the most recent year for which data are available, they 
asked both below- and above-average income “sicker adults” (those who ranked their health 
status as fair or poor and those who had been seriously ill or hospitalized (other than for a normal 
delivery) or had surgery in the preceding two years) whether they had foregone a visit to a doctor, 
failed to get a recommended test, treatment, or follow-up, not filled a prescription, or not received 
needed dental care in the past year because of cost.  Id. at 3, 21.  In each country, some below-
average income adults had foregone medical care because of cost.  Id. at 21.  Averaging results 
from all countries other than the United States, 17% of below-average income adults had not 
visited a doctor, and 18.8% had not filled a prescription or had skipped doses because of cost.  Id.  
In the United States, however, 44% of below-average income sicker adults had not gone to a 
doctor for a medical problem, and 51% had not filled a prescription or had skipped doses because 
of cost.  Id.  Surprisingly, 17% of above-average income adults in the United States had not gone 
to the doctor, and 25% had not filled a prescription or had skipped a dose because of cost.  Id. 
 2. According to one survey including twelve European countries and the United States, the 
U.S. ranked second lowest in the percentage of health care financed publicly and third highest in 
percentage of costs paid out-of-pocket.  Adam Wagstaff & Eddy Van Doorslaer, Equity in Health 
Care Finance and Delivery, in HANDBOOK OF HEALTH ECONOMICS 1804, 1821 (Anthony J. 
Culyer & Joseph P. Newhouse eds., 2000). The one country in the survey that had both a lower 
proportion of publicly-financed health care and a higher proportion of out-of-pocket costs than 
the United States was Switzerland, but the data in the survey are from 1992, and in 1996 
Switzerland adopted a social health insurance system, so its health care cost allocations have 
probably changed in the interim.  Id. 
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relatively low total out-of-pocket levels; indeed, some countries excuse the 
poor and vulnerable entirely from cost-sharing obligations.3 
We also, of course, have massive government health care programs in the 
United States.  Medicare and Medicaid are the largest and best known, but we 
also have a host of more specifically targeted programs funded by federal, 
state, or local government, such as the V.A., Tricare, state mental hospitals, 
and municipal public hospitals.  Our government programs cover tens of 
millions of people and account for very close to half of all health expenditures 
in the United States.4 
Most Americans, however, are covered by private rather than public 
insurance.  About 67% of Americans under the age of sixty-five are privately 
insured.5  Approximately 61% are insured through their employers.6  This is 
over four times the number of Americans under sixty-five who are publicly 
insured.7  Although private health insurance is common throughout the world, 
there is no other country in which such a high percentage of the population 
relies primarily on private insurance for financing access to health care. 
One of the reasons why so many Americans are insured through their 
employers is federal income tax subsidies.  Federal tax law provides that 
money spent by employers on providing health insurance is not considered 
income to the employee for either income or payroll tax purposes.8  This year, 
the United States will spend, according to the President’s 2007 budget, nearly 
$133 billion in foregone tax dollars subsidizing employment-based health 
insurance.9 
This tax subsidy is our third largest government health care finance 
program after Medicare and Medicaid; indeed it equals almost two-thirds of 
 
 3. See MARTIN CHALKLEY & RAY ROBINSON, THEORY AND EVIDENCE ON COST SHARING 
IN HEALTH CARE: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 18–22 (1997). 
 4. Medicaid covers over 55 million Americans and cost $288 billion in 2004.  The 
Medicaid Program at a Glance, MEDICAID FACTS (Kaiser Comm’n on Medicaid & Uninsured, 
Washington, D.C.), May 2006, available at http://www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/7235.pdf.  
Medicare covers nearly 43 million Americans at a projected cost for 2006 of $374 billion.  
Medicare at a Glance, MEDICARE FACT SHEET (Kaiser Fam. Found., Washington, D.C.), July 
2006, available at http://www.kff.org/medicare/upload/1066-09.pdf.  In total, public health 
expenditures accounted for about 45% of total health care spending in 2004, the most recent year 
for which data are available.  Cynthia Smith et al., National Health Spending in 2004: Recent 
Slowdown Led by Prescription Drug Spending, 25 HEALTH AFF. 186, 191 (2006). 
 5. KAISER COMM’N ON MEDICAID & UNINSURED, HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN 
AMERICA: 2004 DATA UPDATE 10 (2005). 
 6. Id. 
 7. See id. 
 8. 26 U.S.C. §§ 106(a), 3121(a)(2) (2000). 
 9. EXEC. OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, BUDGET OF THE UNITED 
STATES GOVERNMENT: FISCAL YEAR 2007—ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES 289 (2006) 
[hereinafter ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES], available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/usbudget/fy07/ 
pdf/spec.pdf. 
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the $201 billion the federal government will spend on Medicaid and the State 
Children’s Health Insurance Program in 2007.10  It is also by far the largest of 
our tax expenditures.  We spend nearly twice as much in tax expenditures on 
subsidizing employment-related health insurance as we do on subsidizing 
interest payments for owner-occupied housing, our second largest tax 
expenditure, and two and a half times as much as we do on subsidizing pension 
plans, our third largest tax expenditure.11  This generous subsidy explains in 
part why employment-related health insurance is so widespread in the United 
States. 
The tax subsidy, however, is only one of several reasons why we have 
employment-related health insurance.  It is common to see in health policy 
literature what I call “the myth of the accidental health insurance system.”  
This myth is that employment-related health insurance in the United States is 
the unintended result of bad public policy.12  The story begins with the 
National War Labor Board (NWLB), which excluded employee benefits from 
wage and price controls during World War II.13  Employers, desperate to 
attract scarce workers, were forced by this exception to offer health insurance 
as a benefit in place of wage increases, creating our current system.14  
Exclusion of health benefits from taxation, also begun during World War II, 
assured that employers continued to offer health benefits after the war ended, 
leaving us with the system we have today.15 
It is a fact that employers were allowed to increase benefits modestly 
during World War II in lieu of wage increases and that some did.16  But it is 
also a fact that health insurance began during the 1930s, not in response to 
government policy, but because consumers wanted to purchase health 
 
 10. Compare id., with BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT: FISCAL YEAR 
2007—APPENDIX 441, available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/usbudget/fy07/pdf/appendix/ 
hhs.pdf. 
 11. We spend $79,860,000 subsidizing owner-occupied housing interest and $52,470,000 on 
employee pensions.  ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 9, at 288–89. 
 12. See, e.g., MICHAEL F. CANNON & MICHAEL D. TANNER, HEALTHY COMPETITION: 
WHAT’S HOLDING BACK HEALTH CARE AND HOW TO FREE IT 61 (2005); JOHN F. COGAN, R. 
GLENN HUBBARD & DANIEL P. KESSLER, HEALTHY, WEALTHY, AND WISE: FIVE STEPS TO A 
BETTER HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 2 (2005). 
 13. See generally TIMOTHY STOLTZFUS JOST, OUR BROKEN HEALTH CARE SYSTEM: CAN 
CONSUMERS FIX IT? (forthcoming Duke Univ. Press 2007). 
 14. Id. 
 15. See Spec. Rul., 433 CCH 8318, ¶ 6587 (Standard Fed. Tax Serv. 1943). 
 16. See JOST, supra note 13; JENNIFER KLEIN, FOR ALL THESE RIGHTS: BUSINESS, LABOR, 
AND THE SHAPING OF AMERICA’S PUBLIC-PRIVATE WELFARE STATE 177–83 (2003); Jennifer 
Klein, The Politics of Economic Security: Employee Benefits and the Privatization of New Deal 
Liberalism, 16 J. POL’Y HIST. 34, 40–42 (2004). 
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insurance rather than to pay for medical expenses out-of-pocket.17  Early Blue 
Cross and commercial health insurance plans were paid for wholly by 
employees without help from their employers, although they were usually 
purchased at the job site on a group basis with employers withholding money 
from wages to pay premiums.18  Employers rarely contributed, and indeed, by 
the end of World War II, less than 10% of Blue Cross premiums were paid by 
employers.19 
It was the efforts of the unions in the late 1940s to make health benefits the 
subject of collective bargaining (supported by the National Labor Relations 
Board and the Supreme Court) rather than tax policy that led to the explosive 
expansion of health benefits in the late 1940s and early 1950s.20  By the time 
the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 formally recognized the tax deductibility of 
employee health benefits, half of the American population had at least hospital 
insurance, as did 70% of workers under collective bargaining agreements.21  
The availability of tax subsidies undoubtedly contributed to the spread of 
employee health coverage up through the 1970s and to employers increasingly 
picking up a larger share of premiums during the 1950s and 1960s.  Tax 
subsidies also led to increasingly generous health insurance packages from the 
1950s through the 1990s, with insurance expanding to cover not just 
hospitalization but also medical, and eventually pharmaceutical, dental, and 
vision expenses.22  But in the end, Americans wanted health insurance; it was 
not forced upon them.23 
Employment-related health insurance in the United States has, on the 
whole, been good for the country.  Individual, non-group health insurance 
policies have very high transactional costs because they must be marketed and 
underwritten on an individual basis.24  They are also often unavailable, or 
available only at very high prices, to persons in ill health who are most in need 
of health insurance.25  Employment-related group health insurance policies, 
 
 17. JOST, supra note 13; PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN 
MEDICINE 290–310 (1982). 
 18. S. Rep. No. 82-359, at 9, 66 (1951). 
 19. Id. at 67. 
 20. See Michael K. Brown, Bargaining for Social Rights: Unions and the Reemergence of 
Welfare Capitalism, 1945–1952, 112 POL. SCI. Q. 645, 647 (1998). 
 21. S. Rep. No. 82-359, at 1–2 (1951); Evan Keith Rowe, Health, Insurance, and Pension 
Plans in Union Contracts, 78 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 993 (1955). 
 22. See Jon R. Gabel, Job-Based Health Insurance, 1977–1998: The Accidental System 
Under Scrutiny, HEALTH AFF., Nov.-Dec. 1999, at 62, 63, 67. 
 23. This argument is developed at much greater length in my forthcoming book.  See JOST, 
supra note 13. 
 24. David A. Hyman & Mark Hall, Two Cheers for Employment-Based Insurance, 2 YALE J. 
HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 23, 31 (2001). 
 25. SARA R. COLLINS ET AL., COMMONWEALTH FUND, SQUEEZED: WHY RISING EXPOSURE 
TO HEALTH CARE COSTS THREATENS THE HEALTH AND FINANCIAL WELL-BEING OF AMERICAN 
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particularly those offered by large employers, have much lower administrative 
costs and permit broader risk-sharing.26  Federal non-discrimination rules have 
to a large extent assured that lower as well as higher income workers who 
work for the same employer have access to health insurance (unless they work 
part-time or are temporary employees).27  Declining employer contributions to 
premiums in recent years and increasing use of part-time or temporary 
employees have led to a declining take-up of health insurance benefits by low 
income employees.28  It is clear, however, that if we did not have tax subsidies 
for employment-related insurance, the number of the uninsured in the U.S. 
would be higher. 
Admiration for employment-based insurance and for the tax subsidies that 
undergird it is far from universal, however.  One common criticism is that the 
tax subsidy is inequitable.29  By one account, the average tax subsidy for health 
insurance for a family earning under $10,000 a year in 2004 was $102, and the 
average tax subsidy for a person earning more than $100,000 a year was 
$2,780.30  Persons who are unemployed or whose employers do not offer 
health insurance receive no benefit at all from the subsidy.  The tax subsidy not 
only disproportionately benefits the wealthy, it also probably 
disproportionately benefits the healthy, since on average the wealthy are 
healthier than the poor, and those who are employed are often more healthy 
than many who are not.31 
The main complaint by conservative critics of the employee health benefit 
is not that it has resulted in too little insurance, however, but rather that it has 
resulted in too much.  Since the early 1970s, conservative and libertarian 
advocacy groups have kept up a steady drumbeat of criticism of the tax 
subsidy.32  This criticism has been steadily gaining in volume and has been 
 
FAMILIES (Sept. 2006), http://www.cmwf.org/usr_doc/Collins_squeezedrisinghltcare 
costs_953.pdf; KAREN POLLITZ, RICHARD SORIAN & KATHY THOMAS, HENRY J. KAISER FAM. 
FOUND., HOW ACCESSIBLE IS INDIVIDUAL HEALTH INSURANCE FOR CONSUMERS IN LESS-THAN-
PERFECT HEALTH? 20 (2001). 
 26. Hyman & Hall, supra note 24, at 30–34. 
 27. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 105(h) (2000). 
 28. GARY CLAXTON ET AL., KAISER FAM. FOUND. & HEALTH RES. & EDUC. TRUST, 
EMPLOYER HEALTH BENEFITS: 2005 ANNUAL SURVEY 40 (2005) [hereinafter KFF/HRET 2005 
SURVEY]. 
 29. John Sheils & Randall Haught, The Cost of Tax-Exempt Health Benefits in 2004, 
HEALTH AFF., Feb. 25, 2004, at W4-106, W4-109, http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/ 
hlthaff.w4.106v1. 
 30. Id. 
 31. See Nancy E. Adler & Katherine Newman, Socioeconomic Disparities in Health: 
Pathways and Policies, HEALTH AFF., Mar.-Apr. 2002, at 60, 61–65. 
 32. See JOST, supra note 13; Mark V. Pauly & John C. Goodman, Tax Credits for Health 
Insurance and Medical Savings Accounts in Incremental Steps Toward Health System Reform, 
HEALTH AFF., Spring 1995, at 125, 127. 
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getting ever more attention in recent years.  The subsidy, they charge, has 
resulted in employers offering and employees accepting far more insurance 
than they would purchase without the tax subsidy, which in turn results in 
excess consumption and higher prices of health care.33  The tax subsidy 
decreases the price of and thus increases the demand for health insurance, 
which in turn decreases the price of and increases the demand for health care.34  
The biggest reason why health care costs so much in the United States, they 
argue, is because of the tax subsidy.35 
The obvious solution to this problem, if it is a problem, is to eliminate the 
tax subsidy.  Urging the elimination of the biggest and one of the most popular 
tax subsidies in the United States, however, is not a platform on which most 
politicians want to run.  An alternative is to replace the tax deduction and 
exclusion with a tax credit for employment-based insurance.36  If this tax credit 
were offered to employers, it might result in more equitable insurance 
coverage, though the credit would probably be significantly lower than the 
actual cost of health insurance, and thus might still not make the purchase of 
health insurance viable for low-wage individuals.37 
More common, however, are proposals to replace the employment-related 
tax exclusion and deduction with individual tax credits.38  Critics of 
employment-related insurance favor individual tax credits because they would 
turn individuals into health insurance purchasers, arguably making them more 
cost-conscious.39  This would also detach insurance from employment, making 
it more portable.  The individual insurance market, however, presents many 
problems which make these proposals troubling.  Some of these have already 
been mentioned40—individual insurance costs a lot more than employment-
related insurance because it imposes marketing, underwriting, and other 
administrative costs that are much higher than those of employment-related 
policies and because it excludes persons who actually have health problems.41  
Tax credit proposals usually do not offer credits high enough to make 
 
 33. CANNON & TANNER, supra note 12, at 46; COGAN, HUBBARD & KESSLER, supra note 
12, at 16. 
 34. CANNON & TANNER, supra note 12, at 48–49, 61–73; COGAN, HUBBARD & KESSLER, 
supra note 12, at 15–16, 27–33. 
 35. See COGAN, HUBBARD & KESSLER, supra note 12, at 2. 
 36. See Robert Cunningham, Joint Custody: Bipartisan Interest Expands Scope of Tax-
Credit Proposals, HEALTH AFF., Sept. 18, 2002, at W292, http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/ 
reprint/hlthaff.w2.290v1.pdf. 
 37. See BARRY FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 514–16 
(5th ed. 2004). 
 38. See Pauly & Goodman, supra note 32, at 127. 
 39. See JOHN C. GOODMAN & GERALD L. MUSGRAVE, PATIENT POWER: SOLVING 
AMERICA’S HEALTH CARE CRISIS 52, 650–51 (1992). 
 40. Hyman & Hall, supra note 24, at 31–33. 
 41. Id. 
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insurance affordable to many of the uninsured, but would probably crowd out 
employment-related coverage, resulting in higher numbers of uninsured.42 
Within the past decade, however, proposed alternatives to employment-
related insurance have increasingly called not simply for tax credits to facilitate 
the purchase of traditional insurance, but rather for subsidies for a particular 
form of insurance—high-deductible insurance coupled with medical savings 
accounts (MSAs) or health savings accounts (HSAs).43  The concept of 
individual savings accounts for health care costs surfaced briefly as an idea for 
expanding access in the 1920s, but was abandoned in favor of collective 
prepayment for health care in the 1930s.44  In the late 1970s, however, the idea 
of individual savings reappeared in an article by Paul Worthington,45 who had 
developed the concept together with Paul Hixson, both employees of the Social 
Security Administration.46  Worthington urged the creation of accounts in 
which money would be invested to use against future medical expenses.47  The 
holder of this account, he argued, would be cautious in purchasing medical 
services and would shop around before doing so for the lowest cost supplier 
because he would be spending his own money.48  Worthington recognized that 
this solution might not work for the chronic poor, the handicapped, and the 
elderly, but considered it the most efficient solution on which to ground a 
system to pay for health care.49 
In the 1980s and 1990s, however, the idea of medical savings accounts 
took on added significance, as it first gained the sponsorship of policy 
advocacy organizations, then became a commercial reality, and finally was 
recognized by first state and then federal legislation that offered tax subsidies 
for MSAs.50  In the early 1980s, Hixson interested John Goodman of the 
recently formed National Center for Policy Analysis (NCPA) in the idea of 
MSAs.51  Goodman in 1984 put forth a proposal for privatizing Medicare 
through medical individual retirement accounts in the Wall Street Journal.52  
 
 42. FURROW ET AL., supra note 37, at 515. 
 43. See generally GOODMAN & MUSGRAVE, supra note 39, at 231–61 (noting that low-
deductible health insurance is wasteful and arguing for high-deductible insurance combined with 
medical savings accounts). 
 44. See JOST, supra note 13. 
 45. See Paul N. Worthington, Alternatives to Prepayment Finance of Hospital Services, 15 
INQUIRY 246, 250–51 (1978). 
 46. Victoria Craig Bunce, Medical Savings Accounts: Progress and Problems Under 
HIPAA, POL’Y ANALYSIS, Aug. 8, 2001, at 8. 
 47. Worthington, supra note 45, at 250–51. 
 48. Id. at 251–52. 
 49. Id. at 252. 
 50. Bunce, supra note 46, at 9–11. 
 51. Id. at 8–9. 
 52. John Goodman & Richard W. Rahn, Salvaging Medicare With an IRA, WALL ST. J., 
Mar. 20, 1984, at 32. 
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At the same time, MSAs began to become available as a commercial product.53  
J. Patrick Rooney, the CEO of Golden Rule Insurance Company (Golden 
Rule), learned of the MSA concept from John Goodman in 1990 and became 
the nation’s foremost policy entrepreneur promoting MSAs.54  Rooney and 
Golden Rule also became major political players, contributing millions of 
dollars to Republicans, including Newt Gingrich.55 
The advocacy work of Rooney, Golden Rule, Goodman, the NCPA, and 
their allies soon began to bear fruit, first at the state level.  Missouri became in 
1993 the first state to enact legislation providing state income tax subsidies for 
employee MSAs.56  Over the next five years, twenty-four more states adopted 
legislation permitting employers, and in some instances individuals, to make 
tax subsidized contributions for MSAs.57  The first attempt to provide federal 
tax subsidies for MSAs was introduced in May 1992 by Representatives Andy 
Jacobs (D-Indiana) and Bill Archer (R-Texas).58  MSAs proved intensely 
controversial, however, and were strongly opposed by many Democrats who 
thought they would undermine employment-related group insurance.59  A 
compromise creating limited tax subsidies for MSAs was finally adopted into 
law as part of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 
(HIPAA) in 1996.60 
HIPAA established a demonstration project allowing tax deductions for 
money contributed to and income earned on MSAs established by small 
employers and the self-employed where the MSA was coupled with High-
Deductible Health Plans (HDHPs).61  The demonstration project, however, was 
limited to four years and to 750,000 participants.62  Though the expiration date 
of the project was extended several times, the HIPAA MSA never caught on, 
 
 53. A Brief History of Health Savings Accounts, BRIEF ANALYSIS (Nat’l Ctr. for Pol’y 
Analysis, Dallas, Tex.), Aug. 13, 2004, available at http://www.ncpa.org/pub/ba/ba481/ 
ba481.pdf. 
 54. Robert Dreyfuss & Peter H. Stone, MediKill, MOTHER JONES, Jan.-Feb. 1996, at 27. 
 55. Id. at 23, 27; Michael Scherer, Medicare’s Hidden Bonanza, MOTHER JONES, Mar.-Apr. 
2004, at 23. 
 56. William R. Bowen, Jr., Policy Innovation and Health Insurance Reform in the American 
States: An Event History Analysis of State Medical Savings Account Adoptions (1993–1996), at 
32–33 (Spring 2005) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Florida State University) (on file with 
author). 
 57. Id. at 33; Bunce, supra note 46, at 10. 
 58. Bunce, supra note 46, at 10. 
 59. See generally Dreyfuss & Stone, supra note 54 (arguing that MSAs would destroy 
Medicare). 
 60. Pub. L. No. 104-191 § 301, 110 Stat. 1936, 2037 (1996). 
 61. 26 U.S.C. § 220(c)(1) (2000). 
 62. Id. § 220(i)–(j). 
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and only about 40,000 to 50,000 MSAs were established in any one year under 
the program.63 
Although the results of the HIPAA demonstration project were 
disappointing, MSA advocates contended that the problem was not with the 
MSA concept, but rather with the restrictions imposed on MSAs by HIPAA.64  
They repeatedly called for dropping those limits65 and finally achieved success 
in 2003 through the Medicare Modernization Act (MMA).66 
The MMA offers tax exclusion to employers and a deduction to employees 
for funds contributed by the employer or employee to an HSA.67  The HSA 
must, however, be coupled with a high-deductible health insurance policy, 
which must have a deductible of at least $1,100 a year for a single individual 
or $2,200 a year for family coverage (in 2007).68  The out-of-pocket maximum 
may not exceed $5,500 for individuals or $11,000 for families for 2007.69  The 
tax subsidies for contributions to the HSA are subject to an absolute limit 
adjusted annually for inflation, which for 2007 is $2,850 for individual 
coverage and $5,650 for family coverage.70 
The HSA was also accompanied by another new health savings device, the 
Health Reimbursement Arrangements (HRA).71  The HRA was created not by 
a statute but rather by the I.R.S.  In 2002, the I.R.S. determined that existing 
legislation authorized the offer of tax subsidies for employer contributions to 
health savings vehicles fully funded by employers.72  The HRA has proved 
attractive to employers because the accounts can be held as notional accounts 
and need not be fully funded and because the funds in them also need not go 
with the employee if he or she leaves employment.73 
 
 63. Bunce, supra note 46, at 13. 
 64. A Brief History of Health Savings Accounts, supra note 53, at 2. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Pub. L. No. 108-173 § 1201, 117 Stat. 2066, 2469 (2003). 
 67. 26 U.S.C. §§ 62(a)(19), 106(d)(1), 223, 3231(e)(11), 3306(b)(18), 3401(a)(22) (2000 & 
Supp. III 2005).  For a description of the law that governs HSAs and the tax issues it raises, see 
Richard L. Kaplan, Who’s Afraid of Personal Responsibility? Health Savings Accounts and the 
Future of American Health Care, 36 MCGEORGE L. REV. 535 (2005). 
 68. Rev. Proc. 2006-53, 2006-48 I.R.B. 996. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Under an HRA, employees are reimbursed for qualified medical expenses.  I.R.S. Notice 
2002-45, 2002-2 C.B. 93, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-drop/n-02-45.pdf; Haneefa T. 
Saleem, U.S. Dept. of Labor Bureau of Labor Statistics, Health Spending Accounts, Dec. 19, 
2003, http://www.bls.gov/opub/cwc/cm20031022ar01p1.htm. 
 72. Rev. Rul. 2002-45, 2002-2 C.B. 93; Rev. Rul. 2002-41, 2002-2 C.B. 75. 
 73. Saleem, supra note 71. 
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HSAs have grown very rapidly since the MMA.  Whereas roughly 438,000 
individuals were covered by HSAs in 2004,74 today the number stands at over 
3.2 million.75  Over $1 billion has been invested in HSAs.76  According to 
America’s Health Insurance Plans (AHIP), 31% of the individuals covered by 
HSA insurance plans were previously uninsured, 33% work for small 
businesses not previously offering coverage, and nearly 50% are aged 40 and 
over.77  Even more people may be covered by HRAs. 
One of the reasons why HSAs have proved so popular is that they are very 
attractive as tax-sheltered investment vehicles.78  According to one scenario, a 
family who invests the maximum amount in an HSA over a forty year period, 
paying for their medical expenses out of pocket rather than from the HSA, 
could accumulate nearly $1.5 million that could be withdrawn at retirement.79  
If instead they used the account to cover $1,250 in medical expenses each year, 
they would still end up with $1.12 million.80  HSAs are not subject to the 
income limits that apply to IRAs81 and are thus very attractive to high-income 
individuals.82  Even more importantly, the income placed in an HSA, unlike 
the income placed in an IRA, will never be taxed if it is used for qualified 
medical expenses—it is a completely tax free means to shelter income for 
retirement.83 
HSAs are also very popular with banks.84  One way of understanding 
HSAs is that they represent a massive transfer of capital from the insurance 
industry to the banking industry.85  Banks have been starved for capital in 
recent years as the demand for borrowing has been high while deposits in 
banks have been minimal,86 and the HSA has been a godsend for banks.  The 
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larger insurance companies have tried to protect their income by buying or 
partnering with banks, but the net result has still been more money for banks.87 
HSAs are popular with some doctors, tired of struggling with managed 
care companies.88  They are also popular with some employers, who see them 
as a way to move from defined-benefit to defined-contribution health plans and 
then to cut their own contributions.89 
Are HSAs a good deal for consumers or for the country, however?  A first 
question is whether they will actually decrease health care expenses.  Money 
contributed to an HSA can be spent for “qualified medical expenses,” which 
are broadly defined to include many things not covered by traditional health 
insurance, such as nursing home care and transportation or lodging while away 
from home to receive medical care.90  HSA custodians and trustees have no 
responsibility for assuring that expenditures are for qualified medical 
expenses.91  That is the responsibility of the HSA owner, subject to normal 
I.R.S. audit procedures.  HSA expenditures will be limited only by the 
imagination, on the one hand, and good faith, on the other, of their owners.  
One possibility, therefore, is that some Americans, who are after all not known 
to be a particularly thrifty people, will spend rather than save their HSAs, 
driving up health care costs. 
A second issue is whether persons with chronic diseases will see a benefit 
from HSAs.  It is quite possible that they will run through their HSAs each 
year at great expense to themselves and will not be able to carry over money in 
the HSA from year to year, but will need to keep refilling it each year.92  Not 
all persons with chronic illnesses stand to lose from HSAs.  Some who 
previously had traditional policies with high coinsurance amounts and high 
out-of-pocket limits may see a reduction in expenses. 
Once consumers reach the limits of their deductibles, their incentives to 
reduce consumption of health care or pay attention to its price are diminished, 
and once they reach the out-of-pocket limit, all remaining incentives to do so 
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cease.93  Because of the skewed nature of health care, most health care costs 
are attributable to persons who would exceed their deductible in any given 
year, so most health care expenses would not be any more subject to market 
discipline under HSAs than they are now.94  The fact that high-deductible 
health insurance policies do not cost dramatically less than standard policies is 
easily understandable given the fact that most medical costs are incurred by 
those whose costs exceed the deductible.95 
The success of consumer-driven health care, moreover, ultimately depends 
on making patients into consumers.96  This in turn depends on getting 
consumers the information they need to make purchasing decisions.97  
Consumers need to know when to seek out professional help, which 
professionals and providers offer the best quality care, how to find the least 
expensive professionals and providers, and which products and services 
recommended by treating professionals are in fact the best and offer the best 
value for money.98  Although consumer-driven health care advocates see great 
promise in the internet to solve all of these problems, someone will have to 
create the information that will go on the internet and put it there, and it is not 
clear who that someone will be.99 
One real advantage of HSAs is that they should lower administrative costs, 
as health insurance plans will be freed from processing many small claims.100  
The cost does not, in a sense, go away entirely, however, but is rather 
transferred to the HSA owner, who must now pay and keep track of all of the 
bills to eventually justify claiming insurance coverage once the deductible is 
met (and to satisfy the I.R.S. in the eventuality of an audit).101  Since expenses 
that qualify for coverage from the HSA are not necessarily the same as those 
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that will qualify for the deductible,102 qualifying for insurance coverage once 
the deductible is met is bound to cause problems for many insured.103  This is, 
of course, always an issue for persons who must meet an insurance deductible, 
but will be more of an issue with high-deductible plans, since more bills will 
need to be paid and documented to prove that the higher deductible has been 
met. 
We are steadily gaining more experience with HSAs, and evidence as to 
their performance is accumulating.104  That evidence, however, is not yet 
conclusive.105  HSA advocates and insurers who offer HSAs claim that HSA-
linked insurance products are dramatically decreasing health care cost 
increases.106  Some of this may be attributable, however, to favorable selection.  
It is easy to hold down health care costs if you insure predominantly healthy 
persons.  There is some evidence that persons who enroll in consumer-driven 
products have a history of low health care costs, though the matter is far from 
settled.107  It is also possible that much of the cost-savings attributable to 
consumer-driven products are in fact cost-shifts to the insured.  For example, 
average deductibles have been rising in HSA-linked plans as premiums have 
been falling.108  Finally, it is possible that savings are real but temporary.  One 
study, for example, found that costs fell in the first year of a consumer-driven 
plan, but by the third year hospitalization rates in the plan exceeded those in a 
traditionally-managed care plan.109  It is simply too early to tell whether HSAs 
will live up to their cost-saving potential.110 
The most important question is what effect high-deductible plans will have 
on the health and economic well-being of consumers.  The evidence here is 
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also decidedly mixed.  One study found that persons with high-deductible 
health insurance plans were significantly less likely than privately-insured 
persons with lower deductibles to see a doctor for a specific medical problem, 
fill a prescription given by a doctor, or get needed specialist care, and 
significantly more likely to not make a follow-up visit recommended by a 
doctor.111  Insured adults with high deductibles are also much more likely to be 
unable to pay medical bills, be contacted by a collection agency, or have to 
change their way of life to pay medical bills.112  Of course, if an employer 
funds the HSA, these effects will be mitigated, but studies of consumer-driven 
plans are finding continuing problems.113  One study, for example, found that 
persons with consumer-driven health plans “were significantly more likely to 
report that they had avoided, skipped, or delayed health care because of costs 
than were those with comprehensive insurance, with problems particularly 
pronounced among those with health problems or incomes under $50,000.”114 
There is also disturbing evidence that consumer-driven health plans in fact 
are being marketed in two rather different markets.  One market consists of 
higher income individuals and families, who disproportionately choose HSA-
linked high-deductible plans.115  Some of these higher income insureds use 
their HSAs solely as tax shelters paying for their health care from other 
sources.116  Many seem to behave as intelligent consumers, using comparative 
information to shop carefully for health care and getting good deals for 
themselves.117 
The other market consists of many persons insured through HSA qualified 
high-deductible health plans who are not receiving contributions from their 
employers for HSAs.118  One study found that one in three employers 
contribute nothing to their employees’ HSAs.119  Many of these individuals are 
also not themselves contributing to HSAs or building up HSA balances that 
they carry over from year to year.120  These lower-income employees are in 
fact ending up simply with high-deductible policies, not with HSAs.121  Many 
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of these individuals and families earn little and have little margin.122  When 
they become ill, therefore, they will face financial ruin.123 
Only time will tell whether HSAs in fact will save the American health 
care system, or whether they will be just one more failed panacea, like health 
planning in the 1970s or HMOs in the 1980s and 1990s.  One thing that we can 
confidently predict, however, is that health policy in the United States will 
continue to be tax policy and that the tax laws will continue to be used in 
efforts to save the health care system.  We can also predict that tax policies that 
end up shifting more and more risk to individual Americans, and particularly 
lower income Americans, will leave more and more of these Americans in 
financial ruin.124 
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